Saturday, July 15, 2006

Q. Was the Missouri Supreme Court collectively
incompetent, prejudice and partial, or were they
corruptly influenced by the enterprise Sprint

My civil case against Sprint and Amdocs was so corrupt that one legal expert exclaimed, "This may well be the most grotesque display of corporate corruption against a single individual that I've ever heard of." Even my own counsel said during dury deliberations in March of 2004, "Your case truly is movie-making material."

These opinions/quotations were expressed two years before my case went before the Missouri Supreme Court. Yes, Sprint was so corrupt throughout litigation that for several years I've told family and friends that they appear to have done just about everything but threaten a human life. And that statement is certainly more true today than ever before. As time permits I will publish trial evidence and transcripts, etc.. But more on that later.

Below is the complaint I recently sent to Chairman Gary M. Gaertner of The Missouri Commission on Retirement, Removal, and Discipline hoping they would investigate the corruption I allege against the Missouri Supreme Court.

In a letter dated May 26, 2006 Chairman Gary M. Gaertner stated that my allegations fall outside the authority of The Commission and was an issue for the appellate court. To the contrary the Court of Appeals clerk and a Judicial Watch lawyer in Washington D.C. informed me that this matter lies squarely with this Commission. This would seem to also coincide with my own previous research. I’ve asked Chairman Gaertner on several occasions to please show me the clause that states the Code of Judicial Conduct Rules violated by the Missouri Supreme Court (specifically Rule 2.03 Canon 1, 2, and 3.) fall outside of this commission’s jurisdiction. Although I’ve received responses on both occasions, the request was ignored. Onward and upward. Surely Missourians would be repulsed to discover such corruption in their highest court.

And though a judiciary commission has been established in nearly all 50 states to be somewhat of a watchdog over the jurists in those states, it would seem that the Missouri Commission's behavior is more of a damage control nature for the Supreme Court.

Table of Contents
1. The Missouri Supreme Court Ruling.
2. Missouri Commission on Retirement, Removal, & Discipline complaint.
3. Respondent's (my counsel’s) Motion for Rehearing.

Click here for the Missouri Supreme Court ruling.

2. The Complaint to the MO Commission on Retirement, Removal, and Discipline.

Although I have about 6000 pages in electronic format in the way of trial and deposition transcripts, trial evidence, briefs filed, motions, and 19 criminal complaint documents, I will provide only a few of the documents at this time. As time permits I will provide more material documentation. Included at this time, along with the link to the Supreme Court’s ruling, is my counsel’s 16-page motion for rehearing which repeatedly references the Legal File which should substantiate my claims of corruption against this high court. The complaint starts here:

Missouri Commission on Retirement, Removal, and Discipline

2190 S. Mason Road, Suite 201
St. Louis, MO 63131

Phone: 314.966.1007 Fax: 314.966.0076

Complaint About Ethics and Rules Violations Committed by
Seven Supreme Court Judges

Complainant’s Name/Address:

John R. Stehno, 2215 Treemont Ct. S, Salem, OR 97302 Phone: 503.363.7788

I have information of possible misconduct on the part of the following Supreme Court jurists:

  • Chief Justice Michael A. Wolff
  • Judge Laura Denvir Stith
  • Judge William Ray Price, Jr.
  • Judge Richard B. Teitelman
  • Judge Ronnie L. White
  • Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr.
  • Judge Mary Rhodes Russell

1. When and where did this happen?

City: Jefferson City, MO
Dates: February 14, 2006 and again on April 11, 2006
Location: Missouri State Supreme Court House

2. If your information arises out of a court case, please answer these questions:

(a) What is the name and number of the case?

John Stehno RES v. Sprint Spectrum, Etc APP Case no: SC87023

(b) What kind of case is it? Civil

(c) What is your relationship to this case? Respondent

(d) If you were represented by an attorney at the time of the conduct of the judges, please identify the attorney:

Woods & Bower, LLC

The Waterworks Building
201 Main Street, Suite 100
Kansas City, MO 64105

3. List documents that help support your information that the judges has engaged in misconduct, noting which ones you have attached:
  • Missouri Supreme Court opinion dated 02/14/06.
  • Respondent’s motion for rehearing dated 03/01/06.
  • Three hardcopy criminal complaints of the 19 criminal complaints for crimes I allege against Sprint, Amdocs, and Modis, their lawyers and agents previously submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and to MO Attorney General. The three hardcopies are:
  • Sprint And Timothy Hearshman
  • Sprint counsel Ann Covington (former MO Supreme Court judge)
  • Sprint senior manager Janette Noel Richert
  • A CD containing all trial and most deposition transcripts, most trial exhibits, 19 criminal complaints, and certain briefs filed by defendants Sprint and Amdocs counsels.
4. Identify, if you can, any other witnesses to the conduct of the judges:
  • Possibly the Honorable Russell’s and other Supreme Court jurists’ law clerks.
  • Essentially all material trial evidence in public record and located on enclosed CD.
5. Specify below the details of what the jurists did that you think constitutes misconduct.

A) This High Court’s Dramatic Departure From Established Law
Some of the more generic and more serious allegations found in my counsel’s motion for rehearing regarding this high court’s ruling include but are not limited to the following:
  • Misinterpretations and/or misapplications of case law causing a dramatic departure from established Missouri law.
  • Overlooked or misinterpreted matters of law including the standard of review and appropriate rules of law set forth in [specific cases cited].
  • Overlooking or misinterpreting a plethora of evidence contradicting this court’s ruling.
  • Not viewing evidence in light most favorable to respondent.
  • Not affording respondent the benefit of all reasonable and favorable inferences to be drawn as required by standard of review.
  • Adopting the appellant’s position of the facts, thereby overlooking or ignoring facts and inferences favorable to respondent.
  • Failing to consider facts and the inferences to be drawn from them.
  • Completely overlooking legal requirements.
  • Overlooking significant evidence regarding the use of improper means.
  • Overlooking significant evidence on this issue including evidence of false statements and threats.
  • Inequitably applied the contracts at issue.
See Respondent’s motion for rehearing elsewhere in these stapled pages (and on enclosed CD) which includes approximately 12 pages of specific bullet items referencing the Legal File to substantiate these allegations and refute this court’s opinion.

To further substantiate my counsel’s claims, below I provide just four examples taken from my previously filed criminal complaints which in turn reference trial evidence (on enclosed CD) demonstrating how this high court must have knowingly, willfully, and intentionally aligned its unanimous ruling with the sheer multitude of false and misleading testimonies of Sprint counsel rather than trial evidence. Thus resulting in this high court’s reversing and remanding the unanimous rulings of both the Court of Appeals and Circuit Court.
Moreover, these four examples may well properly refute this high court’s entire 6 page ruling.
1. This high court ruled and Sprint counsel testified falsely and repeatedly to this and other Missouri courts that Sprint’s tortfeasor Richert was justified in contacting Amdocs via her defamatory emails and phone call that Amdocs’ Ivensky testified were the sole reason for Amdocs dismissing me. To the contrary, trial evidence clearly shows as illustrated in my complaints and in my counsel’s briefs tortfeasor Richert testified repeatedly denying all knowledge whatsoever of her defamatory statements in her emails or phone conversation with Amdocs. See Richert’s criminal complaint examples 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9. Even this high court confirms in its ruling that there is no justification, regardless of contracts or economic interests, if the interference is caused by improper means.

NOTE: BUT FOR tortfeasor Richert’s interference induced by her defamatory emails and phone call which she testified repeatedly denying any knowledge of, I never would have been removed from Amdocs. Therefore, this first example alone should properly refute this high court’s entire ruling.

2. This high court ruled and Sprint counsel testified falsely and repeatedly to this and other Missouri courts that tortfeasor Richert was justified causing my removal to protect Sprint’s economic interests because Sprint had their own DBAs to work on this project. To the contrary, trial evidence clearly shows as illustrated in my complaints and in my counsel’s briefs that Amdocs testified repeatedly they replaced me with another DBA immediately and that their number of DBAs working on this project grew from 2 to 4 and without further protests from Richert or Sprint. See Covington’s criminal complaint example 4. Even this high court confirms in its ruling that there is no justification, regardless of contracts or economic interests, if the interference is caused by improper means.

3. This high court ruled and Sprint counsel testified falsely and repeatedly to this and other Missouri courts that tortfeasor Richert was justified contacting Amdocs to voice her concerns about [Respondent] to protect the corporate interests of her employer. To the contrary, trial evidence clearly shows as illustrated in my complaints and in my counsel’s briefs that not only did tortfeasor Richert testify repeatedly denying all knowledge whatsoever of her defamatory statements, Richert also testified repeatedly that she had no concerns with me working at Amdocs so long as it was any position but a DBA position (See number 2 above). See Richert’s criminal complaint example 6, 11. See also Covington’s criminal complaint example 5 pg 14. Even this high court confirms in its ruling that there is no justification, regardless of contracts or economic interests, if the interference is caused by improper means.

4. This high court ruled and Sprint counsel testified falsely and repeatedly to this and other Missouri courts that I had conflicts with other employees therefore tortfeasor Richert’s defamatory emails and phone call to Amdocs were justified. Moreover, this high court also ruled that I left Richert’s department because of problems with other employees (this is news to me). To the contrary, trial evidence clearly shows as illustrated in my complaints and in my counsel’s briefs tortfeasor Richert repeatedly testified positively about my work habits, my performance, and how well I got along with the other 30-plus members in her group, my 2 supervisors, and how well I got along with tortfeasor Richert herself. See Covington’s criminal complaint example 5, 6. For example, when Richert was asked if she would have renewed my contract had I not left her department, tortfeasor Richert testified, “… we had just renewed him, so I guess that speaks for what we thought of him at that time.” See Covington’s criminal complaint example 5 pg 13. Moreover, even though she had veto power, Richert renewed my contract twice while also providing positive feedback on a regular basis to my consulting company. In an email from tortfeasor Richert (shortly before I resigned from Richert’s group) to my consulting company, “Thanks Mike, we want to keep John as a part of the team. He is an excellent contributor with some great ideas for the team.” See Covington’s criminal complaint example 5 pg 12. Even Sprint’s Senior DBA Michael Whitmore’s reference to Amdocs stated, “John is first among prospective DBAs.” See Covington’s criminal complaint example 5. So overwhelmingly consistent and positive is tortfeasor Richert’s trial evidence and testimony pertaining to her thoughts of me that it should be far easier for a reasonable court to conclude that I was a model contractor rather than conclude Richert had issues with me professionally or personally. Even this high court confirms in its ruling that there is no justification, regardless of contracts or economic interests, if the interference is caused by improper means.

I literally could go on and on refuting nearly every sentence of this high court’s ruling. This ruling, including the rather puzzling footnotes, is that non-sensical, that contrary to trial evidence, yet so lock-step with Sprint counsel’s multitude of false and misleading testimonies heaped upon this and other Missouri courts. However, I’ve already refuted much of the material elements in my criminal complaints (on enclosed CD) filed last summer with the SEC and MO Attorney General.

B) Evidence of Impropriety
Furthermore, is it mere coincidence:

  • That the Honorable Ann Covington (former MO Supreme Court judge) became Sprint’s lead outside counsel 14-16 months ago, perhaps for this very purpose?
  • That one or more current or former Supreme Court jurists did not recuse themselves when this high court allowed former colleague Ann Covington to appear before them representing Sprint?
  • That this high court appeared openly hostile to my counsel during oral arguments by routinely interrupting my counsel’s responses to questions and asking questions that appeared to force my counsel to defend existing laws?
  • That this high court assigned this case to the honorable Mary Russell who apparently is the only jurist NOT to sit on the Supreme Court with the honorable Ann Covington who recently represented Sprint before this court?
  • That this high court chose to hear this case despite the lower courts’ unanimous rulings?
    That the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court had little difficulty looking beyond Sprint’s multitude of false and misleading testimonies when they unanimously ruled granting us a retrial?
  • That two of the 3 Court of Appeals jurists who ruled in my case were the same jurists who ruled in Hensen v. Truman Medical Center that this Supreme Court claims was not applicable to my case?
  • That, although trial evidence clearly shows tortfeasor Richert wanted to keep me employed in her group and that she had no problem with me working at Amdocs, this high court’s ruling is lock-step with Sprint counsel Covington’s many false and misleading testimonies which in turn are lock-step with Richert’s ‘secret’ and defamatory emails but are in direct opposition to Richert’s trial evidence and testimony where she also denied any knowledge of her defamatory statements?
  • That, considering Sprint’s previously alleged criminal racketeering activities (including its collaborating and conspiring with 2 other corporations’ lawyers and agents), this high court would randomly choose this case to willfully neglect its duty and thereby abandon its sole purpose for existing?
  • That, even when given the opportunity via Respondent’s motion for retrial, this high court refused to cure its failures thereby implying their contentment (and perhaps arrogance) to let the corrupt ruling stand?

C) Setting Dangerous New Precedents
Furthermore, this high court’s ruling appears so reckless that as a direct result, it would seem this ruling set several dangerous precedents by sanctioning internet fraud (the initial method used by tortfeasor Richert of which the FBI still considers a criminal offense), defamation, slander, libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and perhaps other causes that were once independently actionable in the State of Missouri, but now appear to be protected by this Supreme Court.

D) The Bigger Picture
Although my complaint against this panel of jurists should stand on its own, I’ve included copies of my previously submitted criminal complaints (on enclosed CD) to better illustrate how this ruling appears to be only a part of the bigger picture. When considering this high court’s ruling in the broader sense of the enterprise Sprint’s criminal racketeering spree I alleged in my criminal complaints, it would seem this high court, like Amdocs and Modis before it, also knowingly or unknowingly aligned itself with a criminal racketeering organization, the enterprise Sprint. Whatever prompted this high court to abandon its sole purpose for existing should matter little as the end result was the desired outcome of The Enterprise. Given the above, I don’t think it possible for a reasonable person to conclude that this high court in this particular ruling coincidently and collectively ‘checked its brain off at the door’ especially when the obvious link between this high court and Sprint is Covington.

E) Violating Multiple Missouri Code of Judiciary Conduct Rules
This high court was either collectively incompetent, prejudice and partial, or corruptly influenced by another entity. Given the status of this high court, it would seem that incompetence can be safely ruled out. Regardless, this high court willfully neglected its duty and in so doing repeatedly violated at least the following Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct Rules:

  • 2.03. Canon 1. A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary.
  • 2.03. Canon 2. A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge's Activities.
  • 2.03. Canon 3. A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently.

F) Violating Multiple Sections of the Missouri Constitution
Furthermore, it would seem as a result of this high court’s ruling, they also violated the following articles of the Missouri Constitution:


  • Section 14 - Open courts--certain remedies--justice without sale, denial or delay.
  • Section 2 - Promotion of general welfare--natural rights of persons--equality under the law--purpose of government.
  • Section 10 - Due process of law.
  • Section 32 - Crime victims' rights. Subsection 1.(4) and 1.(5).


  • Section 9 - Transfer of causes to supreme court en banc.
  • Section 10 - Transfer of cases from court of appeals to supreme court--scope of review.


  • Section 11 - Oath of office.


  • Section 1 - Impeachment--officers liable--grounds.

G) Further Damages
As agents of the State of Missouri this high court, knowing its rulings are published publicly, further defamed me by knowingly, willfully, and intentionally publishing falsified evidence against me via their ruling. Moreover, this high court breached its fiduciary duty to me and to the citizens of Missouri for willful neglect of duty and for knowingly falsifying trial evidence that not only denied me my constitutional rights, including my right to work, but also halted my rightful attempts for monetary recovery of actual and punitive damages.

In conclusion, this high court’s ruling is so non-sensical and so lock-step with the enterprise Sprint counsel’s many false and misleading testimonies that it would seem this ruling had to be ghost-written by Sprint’s Ann Covington herself and this panel of jurists simply signed off on it.

One need not look any further than Covington’s criminal complaint and Sprint’s few briefs co-authored by Covington (on enclosed CD) filed with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court which contain perhaps 600 intentionally false and misleading testimonies heaped on these courts. Buried within those few documents, the reader just may find the corrupted origins of an arrogant and reckless Supreme Court ruling.

Finally, if what I allege about this high court is true then this panel of jurists committed crimes against the State of Missouri and the United States and should be prosecuted and incarcerated to deter other jurists from similar behavior. Moreover, this corrupt ruling should bring into question the integrity of every recent ruling and decision made by this high court.

A. All trial and most deposition transcripts, most of the trial exhibits, and certain briefs can be found on enclosed CD.

B. My trial transcript page and line references will most likely not directly match up with my counsel’s Legal File references simply because I do not possess the Legal File (at least not in its entirety). Nevertheless, any of my counsel’s LF references should easily be found via a text search in the trial and deposition transcripts located on enclosed CD.

C. Case overview: From an overly broad perspective, the original civil case is about a rogue Sprint senior manager who has the very unusual behavior of taking it quite personally when one leaves her employ for other opportunities. So personal in fact that Richert has a history of hunting down those former employees and contractors attempting to get them fired from their current assignment whether it be in another department at Sprint or another company. Previous victims include Mike Peck and Joe Madden and perhaps others. See Plaintiff’s deposition exhibit 23. This case is also about Sprint’s Senior Vice President of Human Resources Ben Watson’s attempts to cover the tortfeasor’s wrongdoing rather than confront and correct it when, in good faith, I brought this matter to his attention. I am not the first to have been hunted down by the tortfeasor, but because of the economy in a tailspin just days after the terrorist attacks, I was the most damaged. The case itself is rather simple, but the corruption from beginning to end is almost unfathomable.

More simply, I see this case as analogous to a movie-theater manager who wrongfully and intentionally shouted fire in a crowed theater knowing that I would be the only one trampled. And though the manager denied ever shouting fire, the evidence is undeniably clear that she did. Yet to protect themselves, the movie theater owners created much smoke to justify her shouts of fire. But even with all the smoke created there simply was no fire.


___ I choose to waive the confidentiality of Supreme Court Rule 12 and request that a copy of my complaint be sent to the jurists.

_X_ I do not waive the confidentiality provided by Supreme Court Rule 12 and request that the Commission not disclose my identity to the jurists.

Signature: (John Stehno) Date: 04/21/06

3. Motion for Rehearing at MO Supreme Court.


Respondent, )
v. ) Case No. 87023
Appellant. )


COMES now Respondent, John Stehno and, pursuant to Rule 84.17, Mo.R.Civ.P., moves for a rehearing of this matter following this Court’s Opinion filed February 14, 2006. Specifically, Respondent seeks rehearing because it appears that the Court overlooked or misinterpreted several material matters of fact. Further, this Court’s Opinion appears to have overlooked or misinterpreted matters of law including the standard of review and the appropriate application of rules of law set forth in Hensen v. Truman Med. Ctr. Inc., 62 S.W.3d 549, 533 (Mo.App. 2001) and Eggleston v. Phillips, 838 S.W.2d 80 (Mo.App. 1992). In support of this motion for rehearing, Respondent states as follows:

1. This Court overlooked the requirements of the standard of review for evaluating the trial court’s grant of a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Although this Court’s Opinion refers to the standard of review on page four, the Opinion when read as a whole makes it abundantly clear that there is no finding of “manifest abuse” as required by Robinson v. Wampler, 389 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Mo. 1965). Moreover, as is more fully discussed below, it is clear from the face of the Opinion that this Court neither viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent nor afforded respondent the benefit of all reasonable and favorable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, as required by Fabricor, Inc. v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 24 S.W.3d 82, 93 (Mo. App. 2000). In fact, when read as a whole, the Opinion obviously adopts appellant’s view of the facts, overlooking or ignoring facts and inferences favorable to respondent. When properly viewed in the light most favorable to Stehno, the evidence in this case amply demonstrates the submissibility of respondent’s case and proves that Judge Connett did not manifestly abuse his “nearly unfettered discretion” in granting the motion for new trial.

2. In finding that Stehno failed to present sufficient evidence of a valid business expectancy, this Court overlooked or misinterpreted many material facts. The Court adopted Sprint’s labeling of Stehno as a “temporary worker” in making this finding and attempting to distinguish Hensen. This is not only an improper failure to view the facts in the light most favorable to Stehno, it is a distinction without a difference. This Court’s Opinion states: “Hensen was not a temporary contractor, but was assigned to work at Truman indefinitely in a specific assignment.” Like Hensen, Stehno was assigned to work at Amdocs indefinitely in a specific assignment. He was a full-time employee of Modis placed at Amdocs specifically to work on the billing software project. There was no evidence of a specific term of his placement, i.e. he was placed indefinitely. Stehno’s employment status was exactly like Hensen’s except Hensen did not have the potential to convert to a full-time Truman employee. Thus, Stehno had an even greater business expectancy than Hensen could possibly have had1. Moreover, a plethora of facts, all of which are conspicuously absent from this Court’s Opinion, demonstrated the more permanent nature of Stehno’s placement at Amdocs, including the following:

• Waldman testified that Amdocs uses a careful recruiting process to make sure that the “talent pool” stays with the company long term. L.F. 223.

• Although Keren did not typically interview people who were not going to be at Amdocs long-term, he participated in Stehno’s interview. Tr. 266-269; L.F. 384.

• Keren recommended bringing Stehno on as a team leader and acknowledged that there would be no benefit to Amdocs in bringing Stehno on as a team lead short-term. Tr. 271-272, 281-282; L.F. 446-448, 529.

• Stehno was placed at Amdocs through Modis. Tr. 371.

• Modis had placed approximately twenty contractors at Amdocs. Tr. 371.

• Modis has placed employees as consultants for up to five years. Tr. 407.

• Modis also sometimes places employees to “go permanent” at their assignments. Tr. 320.

• More than one half of Modis’ placements are for more than six months. Tr. 370-371.

• Between one half and three quarters of Modis’ placements at Amdocs became Amdocs employees. Tr. 372.

• In fact, the Modis contract with Amdocs contains a specific provision for conversion of Modis employees to Amdocs employees. Tr. 372-374.

• Amdocs usually hired Modis contractors as Amdocs employees after six months or one year and, therefore, almost never paid a conversion fee to hire the employees directly. Tr. 374.

• From Modis’ point of view, Stehno’s placement with Amdocs could initially be for six months or longer. Tr. 387.

• Amir, Modis’ Managing Director, testified that he would not have been surprised if Stehno became an Amdocs employee. Tr. 387.

• Waldman, who consulted with Ivensky on staffing issues related to this project, testified that Stehno would have been considered for permanent employment with Amdocs. L.F. 224, 232.

• Moreover, Waldman testified that Stehno’s placement as a contractor did not indicate a short-term relationship. L.F. 224, 232.

• Gary Hood, who managed the area where Stehno worked, was very impressed with Stehno’s work and expected him to become a team lead. L.F. 281, 388. Over time, Hood believed the team lead position would become more of a permanent mantel or a financial reward for Stehno. L.F. 389.

• Ivensky was also impressed with Stehno. After only four days on the assignment, Ivensky could tell that Stehno’s technical background was considerable. Tr. 816.

• There were no problems with Stehno’s work during this time frame. L.F. 280.

The Court’s failure to consider these facts and the inferences to be drawn from them requires a rehearing of this matter. Further, the Court apparently misinterpreted the evidence as indicating that Stehno was hired as a DBA at Amdocs to perform the same function as the DBAs in Richert’s department. See, Opinion at pages 2 (“Amdocs assigned Stehno to work on the Sprint billing system as a database administrator (DBA)”) and 3 (“Richert explained to Amdocs that Sprint was to provide the DBAs from her department and that there were four DBAs already assigned to the Sprint billing systems project. Amdocs employees were to be used as application developers and not DBAs.”) No evidence supports this conclusion. It was undisputed at trial that Stehno was hired as an ADBA, or applications database administrator, to perform the same function as the other Amdocs employees and contractors working on the project.

3. Additionally, this Court’s Opinion overlooks or misinterprets many material facts in concluding that Stehno failed to make a submissible case on the issue of the absence of justification. Once again, the Court appears to adopt Sprint’s position on the facts, failing to view the facts in the light most favorable to Stehno. First, the Court overlooked Sherry’s testimony in concluding that there was no evidence that Sprint did not have an economic interest in determining who worked on the project at Amdocs. Sherry admitted that Sprint did not have an economic interest in determining who Amdocs hired to work on the project. Tr. 779. While this evidence alone is sufficient to eliminate a conclusion that “there is a complete absence of probative fact to support” Stehno’s position, ample other evidence demonstrated the absence of an economic interest justifying Sprint’s actions, including the following:

• Ivensky testified that when Sherry gave his verbal approval to hire Stehno, Sherry conveyed that SPCS did not feel that bringing Stehno on board at Amdocs would “jeopardize our relationship.” L.F. 278.

• Not only did Sherry testify directly that Sprint did not have an economic interest in Stehno’s relationship with Amdocs, Sprint was unable to produce a single witness to testify that Sprint did have such an economic interest.

• The jury could rely on Sherry’s approval of Stehno to work on the project as an indication that Sprint did not have a legitimate economic interest in preventing Stehno from working on the project.

• Finally, evidence related to Sprint’s Human Resources policies inferentially demonstrated that Sprint did not have a legitimate economic interest in Stehno’s contract.

Moreover, the mere presence of an economic interest is not sufficient to demonstrate justification. Rather, the actor must have been acting to protect that economic interest. See, Kruse Concepts, Inc. v. Shelter Mutual Ins., 16 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Mo. App. 2000); Wigley v. Capital Bank of Southwest Missouri, 887 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Mo. App. 1994). This Court’s Opinion completely overlooks this legal requirement. Although the Court relies on the various contracts in the case to claim Richert had a right to act as she did, she, as the only one who could testify about her motivations, did not claim to be acting pursuant to any contract.2 Once again, the Court’s Opinion overlooks multiple additional facts demonstrating that Sprint was not acting to protect any alleged economic interest in contacting Amdocs about Stehno’s work there, including the following:

• Richert testified that she had no concern regarding Amdocs hiring Stehno specifically, as opposed to hiring DBAs in general. L.F. 332.

• Richert also testified that she had no problem with Stehno working as an ADBA on the Rodeo project. L.F. 324.

• Richert testified specifically that she did not call Ivensky to address any problem with Stehno working on the project. Rather, Richert testified that her sole purpose in calling Ivensky was to discuss the DBA/ADBA situation. L.F. 328.

• Stehno had no contact with Sprint employees prior to his termination and would have had little in the future. L.F 383.

• Hood testified that Stehno did not work with any Sprint employees. L.F. 383.

• Waldman met with hundreds of people onsite at Sprint, including the primary people responsible for the project in the 1999-2000 time frame. L.F. 225. However, Waldman never met Richert. Id.

• Hood, the manager in charge of Stehno’s area, never had any interaction with Richert. L.F. 383. Hood testified that Richert was not involved in the project in any way. Id .

• Ivensky, the project director for Amdocs, did not remember speaking to Richert before she contacted him regarding Stehno and only recalled speaking with her once or twice after that conversation. L.F. 283.

• Stehno’s replacement never met with Richert either. L.F. 383.

• Richert testified that her department had little to no involvement with third party vendors and none of the people on her team worked directly on the Rodeo project. L.F. 305-306, 316.

• Richert does not know any of the Amdocs individuals on the project personally. L.F. 319.

• In fact, while Richert knew that someone on the application side at Sprint was responsible for overall oversight on the Rodeo project, she did not even know who that was. L.F. 320.

• Despite the allegations of Stehno’s difficulties while in Richert’s department, Stehno was able to move to another Sprint department without any trouble. L.F. 315, 321

• While he was still in Richert’s department, Stehno’s contract was renewed twice. L.F. 307.

• Richert had the power to veto those renewals, but chose to approve them instead. L.F. 308-309.

• Richert testified that Stehno had no negative interactions with his team while in Richert’s department. L.F. 310. In fact, Richert testified that, at the time of his departure from her department, Sprint had just renewed Stehno, which “spoke to what they thought of him.” L.F. 315.

• The DBA/ADBA issue was discussed before Stehno was placed on the project and the substance of those conversations did not change following Stehno’s termination. L.F. 285.

• Amdocs never had any DBAs (as opposed to applications DBAs) working at Sprint at any time during the project. L.F. 274.

• While Richert claimed the Stehno situation was a byproduct of general disagreements between Sprint and Amdocs over the division of responsibilities, there was no change in the relationship between Amdocs and Sprint or in Amdocs’ responsibility on the project after Richert’s phone call. L.F. 328; 294.

• Stehno was the sole casualty in this situation. The end result of the conversation did not affect anyone else’s employment or consulting status L.F. 289.

• Amdocs’ responsibilities on the project did not change following Stehno’s termination. L.F. 381-382.

• Hood, Stehno’s manager, was never told that Amdocs should not use DBAs. L.F. 381.

• Stehno was himself replaced on the project, suggesting that the concern did not relate to the position or the number of Amdocs personnel working on the project. L.F. 294.

• Ivensky’s testimony regarding Richert’s specific comments during their phone conversations and in her e-mail demonstrates that Richert was not acting to protect a legitimate economic interest in preventing DBAs from working on the project. Richert’s e-mail raised two separate issues: the DBA/ADBA issue and that she did not recommend Stehno. Tr. 785.

• Richert did not indicate that her concern was that Stehno was working as a DBA. L.F. 287. Rather, Richert indicated a preference for not hiring Stehno. Tr. 789.

• Richert’s concerns regarding Stehno had nothing to do with his job title or duties and Ivensky understood that the ADBA/DBA issue was a separate issue from Stehno. Tr. 790, 807.

• The e-mail Richert and Ivensky exchanged also demonstrate that the issues were separate by numbering them as separate items and addressing them as separate paragraphs. L.F. 406-407.

This evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that Stehno proved that Richert was not acting to protect any alleged economic interest in interfering with his placement at Amdocs, thereby establishing a submissible case, justifying Judge Connett’s Order granting a new trial.

4. This Court’s Opinion also overlooks significant evidence regarding the use of improper means. While this Court refers in passing to Stehno’s arguments regarding improper means, the Opinion overlooks significant evidence on this issue including evidence of false statements and threats. The Court’s Opinion overlooks the following evidence demonstrating false statements about Stehno:

• The inconsistencies between Richert’s testimony and her written communications with Amdocs demonstrates that Richert misrepresented facts to Amdocs regarding plaintiff.

• Richert testified that she did not have any more conflicts with plaintiff than with other DBAs under her supervision. L.F. 313.

• Stehno testified that he got along well with Richert and that she gave him positive feedback. Tr. 528-529.

• Mike Rivera, who placed Stehno in Richert’s department, discussed Stehno with Richert on a regular basis. Tr. 654-655.

• Rivera spoke with Richert monthly and her feedback about Stehno was always positive. Tr. 655.

• Richert never mentioned any conflicts between Stehno and others. Tr. 655.

• Rivera also testified that Stehno’s multiple renewals were considered positive feedback in the industry. Tr. 656; L.F. 391.

• Richert indicated to Rivera that Stehno was an “excellent contributor” and they “want to keep John as part of the team.” Tr. 657; L.F. 391.

• Richert also stated that Stehno was “an asset to our team.” Tr. 658.

• In contrast, in her e-mail communication to Amdocs, Richert referred to Stehno as a “magnet for conflict” and “high maintenance.” L.F. 406.

The jury could easily conclude that Richert’s statements were misrepresentations of fact given her inconsistent actions and testimony. Moreover, these were false statements tending to prejudice Stehno in his business. This Court also overlooked evidence that Richert’s e-mail conveyed a threat regarding the Sprint contract to Amdocs, including the following:

• Ivensky felt the “we” in Richert’s e-mail was Richert representing the group as a whole. Tr. 803.

• Richert reinforced this concept by copying her e-mail to higher management individuals at Sprint, like Sherry. L.F. 406-408.

• Based on Richert’s comments in the e-mail and on the phone, Ivensky felt like he was protecting the jobs of 300 people in letting Stehno go. Tr. 805.

• Ivensky felt pressured to resolve the situation quickly because a senior manager was complaining. Tr. 790-792.

• Likewise, Keren viewed Richert’s second e-mail as an escalation stating, “It’s becoming even more problematic.” Tr. 302.

• Keren was concerned that somebody pretty high up at Sprint was expressing concerns and action needed to be taken to preserve a good relationship with Sprint. Tr. 319-320.

This testimony could have been the basis for the jury’s conclusion that Richert used threats to interfere with Stehno’s business relationship with Amdocs, once again demonstrating improper means, establishing a submissible case and justifying the Order granting a new trial.

5. Finally, this Court’s Opinion misinterprets the application of Eggleston v. Phillips, 838 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. App. 1992). Eggleston, was not a tortious interference case, but as the Court of Appeals recognized was “in reality an attempt to recover for wrongful discharge.” 838 S.W.2d at 83. The holding in Eggleston was specifically limited to a situation involving a supervising employee over an employee at will, a factual situation not remotely similar to the present one where Richert and Stehno weren’t even employed by the same company. This Court’s reliance on Eggleston in the present context is not only a dramatic departure from established Missouri law, it is a misinterpretation and misapplication of the law requiring rehearing.

WHEREFORE, for the forgoing reasons, Respondent, John Stehno, by and through his counsel, hereby requests a rehearing on the issues raised above.

Respectfully submitted,


Aaron N. Woods #36832
Lisa C. Bower #49470
The Waterworks Building
201 Main Street, Suite 100
Kansas City, MO 6410



I hereby certify that one copy of the above and foregoing was served by First Class U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, on this 1st day of March, 2006, upon counsel of record, as follows:

Ann K. Covington
K. Lee Marshall
Elaine Drodge Koch
One Metropolitan Square
211 N. Broadway, Suite 3600
St. Louis, Missouri 63102


Motion for Rehearing Footnotes

1 The Court’s attempt to distinguish Hensen based on an assertion that Richert retained the right to remove Stehno at any time is unsupported by the evidence and a misinterpretation of Hensen. Richert did not even have authority to hire or fire employees within her department, much less those on a different project she did not supervise. Perhaps, that is why she worded her e-mail in a fashion to suggest that those who actually had such authority were in agreement with her defamatory statements about Stehno. Moreover, Truman, the interferer in Hensen, retained the right to remove individuals placed by REN for failure to comply with Truman’s guest relations policies. Hensen, 62 S.W.3d at 558. Despite this evidence the Hensen court found not only that Hensen made a submissible case, but upheld the jury verdict in his favor.

2 Moreover, this Court has inequitably applied the contracts at issue, claiming on the one hand that Stehno could not have a reasonable business expectancy because of the contractual provisions, but asserting on the other that because Stehno was not a party to the contract between Sprint and Amdocs, Sprint had no obligation to comply with the terms of the contract in order to claim an unqualified legal right.